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Abstract
This article considers the matters arising during the judicial review of the management of the 
assistance provided through the European Social Fund for the promotion of employment. Issues 
such as the direct actions for annulment, the actions for failure to act, the enforcement actions, the 
preliminary rulings and the actions for damages are examined in detail. The analysis focuses on 
topics like the identity of the reviewable acts, the standing of the applicants, the grounds of review, 
etc. 
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Analyse konzentriert sich auf Themen wie die Identität der nachprüfbaren Rechtsakte, die Stellung 
der Beitrittskandidaten, die Überprüfungskriterien etc.
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1 Introduction   
Many dispositions of the EC Treaty demonstrate the European Union’s interest in promoting 
employment. Perhaps the most fundamental is Art 2 according to which the Community has to 
promote, inter alia, a high level of employment and of social protection. This provision was added 
by the EU Treaty to the very first chapter of the EC Treaty. It therefore constitutes a basic principle 
of Community action. From its wording, the Community is clearly obliged to promote employment 
and social protection.  
The promotion of employment by the Community is performed at two levels. First, there is the 
development of a legislative framework (including both primary and secondary Community 
legislation) regarding many aspects of social policy and employment, and thus creating “European 
Social Law”, “European Employment Law” and “European Labour Law”. Second, there is the 
development of the so called “flanking policies” (E. Szyszczak, 2000, p. 159 ) , meaning the use of 
structural instruments (among them the European Social Fund) in order to reorientate and restructure 
the Member States’ economies and thus fulfil the objectives mentioned in Art. 3 EC Treaty. In this 
latter case, the relevant measures encourage through financing certain sort of activities over others 
thus operating as an indirect method of regulating matters of employment. This is a delicate issue. 
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EC Treaty). The Member States and the Community (after Amsterdam) now have joint competence 
to develop an employment strategy (See Art. 125 of the EC Treaty). Nevertheless, it is still argued 
that all social policy issues, including employment, remain principally within the competence of the 
Member States (T. Hervey, 1998, p. 4), so all European initiatives and activities in that area are seen 
as supplementary to the Member States’ national social policies (P. Tsakloglou, 1996, p. 211). It has 
been noted that the Commission uses the programmes financed by the Structural Funds in order to 
claim an interest in the field of employment, although it has no formal competence (T. Hervey, op. 
cit., p. 52).  
For the past 40 years, especially the two last decades, the European Social Fund (ESF) has been the 
European Union’s main source of finance to help people to help themselves (European Commission, 
1998). The relevant resources are currently managed according to Council Regulation 99/1260/EC 
laying down general provisions concerning the Structural Funds (OJ 1999, L 161/1) and Council 
Regulation 99/1784/EC concerning the European Social Fund (OJ 1999, L 213/5). Since this 
management is described in legislative provisions, it can be reviewed judicially. The legality of 
action of the European institutions is very significant and the financial propriety, legitimacy and 
accountability in the allocation of resources must be safeguarded (T. Hervey, op. cit., p. 39). The 
competent institutions for the judicial review at Community level are the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI). The legal basis for judicial review consists mainly of 
Articles 230 and 232 EC Treaty. Reference will also be made to Articles 226, 234 and 288 EC 
Treaty. The latter Articles can be applied in order to provide solutions to problems identified in the 
management of ESF resources. Their function is supplementary to the main provisions on judicial 
review. Consequently, below, the following aspects are examined: direct actions for annulment, 
actions for failure to act, enforcement actions, preliminary rulings and actions for damages.  
2
2 Direct Actions for annulment   
In analyzing such actions with regard to the management of ESF resources, several issues can be 
identified. One involves the question of whether the Commission or another body has adopted the 
contested act. Another concerns the reviewablity of acts in the context of ESF management 
procedures. A major issue is the locus standi of regional/local authorities and the recipients (natural 
and legal persons) of structural assistance to bring an action for annulment before the ECJ. Some 
interesting matters also arise concerning the grounds of annulment. Finally, the time limits for 
bringing an action for annulment can be confusing, given the complexity of procedures about the 
management of ESF resources. The relevant provisions are included in Art. 230 EC Treaty.  
2.1 Reviewable Acts   
According to Art. 230(1) EC Treaty:  
“The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the European 
Parliament and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the 
European Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the 
European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.”  
The legislation regarding the ESF provides for the Commission to adopt the relevant legislative acts. 
Originally, the ECJ and the CFI confirmed that only the Commission assumed (vis-à-vis the 
recipient) legal responsibility for approving, suspending, reducing, or withdrawing ESF assistance 
Seite 2 von 22 EIoP: Text 2002-001 Full Text
29.01.02 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-001.htm(C-32/95, Commission of the European Communities v. Lisrestal-Organização Gestão de 
Restaurantes Colectivos Lda and Others, [1996] ECR I-5373 at I-5397 para 29; T-271/94, Eugenio 
Branco Lda v. Commission of the European Communities, [1996] ECR II-749 at II-763 para 39; T-
151/95, Instituto Europeu de Formação Profissional Lda (INEF) v. Commission of the European 
Communities, [1997] ECR II-1541 at II-1553 para 36). National authorities cooperated with the 
Commission but were not responsible for any final decision regarding the management of ESF 
resources. It was noted that the procedure established by those Regulations created a financial 
relationship between the Commission and the Member State authorities on the one hand and between 
those authorities and the recipient of the financial assistance on the other (C-310/81, Ente Italiano di 
Servizio Sociale (EISS) v. Commission of the European Communities, [1984] ECR 1341 at 1353 para 
15). It is interesting to consider whether this two-level relationship is still maintained under the 
provisions currently regulating the ESF, especially considering that one of the most important 
principles of the standing provisions is the partnership between the Commission and national 
authorities in ESF programmes.(1) It could be argued that the national authorities now share the 
responsibility for all final decisions with the Commission. This does not seem convincing. It is true 
that, under the current provisions, the role of the national authorities is very important. They 
participate greatly in drawing, negotiating, implementing, monitoring and evaluating the structural 
operations funded by the ESF. The responsibility, however, for producing a legally binding act 
regarding the approval, reduction, withdrawal or suspension of ESF assistance lies exclusively with 
the Commission.  
3
However, the situation is less clear with regard to projects financed within the framework of the 
operational programmes of a Community Support Framework. More specifically, the Member States 
submit draft operational programmes to the Commission, which is competent to approve them. These 
drafts do not contain specific information on particular projects to be financed within the operational 
programmes’ scope, therefore the Commission’s approval of the programme as a whole does not 
necessarily imply specific approval of its constituent parts (J. Scott, 1999, p. 633). Consequently it 
remains uncertain who actually approves the projects included in operational projects. The solution 
to this problem can be found in examining the role of the Monitoring Committees responsible for the 
supervision of the programmes’ implementation. It is true that the current provisions (Articles 35(3) 
and 15(6) of Council Regulation 99/1260/EC), the Monitoring Committees must approve the 
complement programmes containing all the details of the measures to be implemented within the 
scope of the operational programmes. These complement programmes must be submitted to the 
Commission for information purposes. Consequently, these documents determine the exact content 
of the measures to be implemented under the operational programmes. This is actually a form of 
project selection. It is therefore concluded that the authority selecting the projects to be financed 
under the operational programmes is the relevant Monitoring Committee. Since this Committee 
operates within the legal, institutional and financial framework of a Member State and the 
Commission participates only in an advisory capacity, any judicial action against the Committee’s 
decisions falls within the jurisdiction of the national courts. It is true that, in practice (J. Scott, 1999, 
p. 635), the Commission officials attending the Monitoring Committee do not simpy adopt an 
advisory role, even declaring projects ineligible. If, despite this, a project is approved, the 
Commission’s official states his/her objection to including the project within the proramme’s 
expenditure. This type of participation by the Commission, although understandable given its task to 
implement the budget under Art. 274 EC Treaty, does not alter the nature of the decision adopted by 
the Monitoring Committee. Furthermore, such behaviour or the absence thereof, on the 
Commission’s part, cannot constitute a reviewable act. However, it has been suggested (J. Scott, op. 
cit., p. 636), that the Commission’s behaviour can be reviewed judicially.  
Nevertheless, these proceedings must be distinguished from the actual procedure of authorizing 
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entails a decisive authority since the Authorizing Officer (with regard to the ESF, this officer is the 
Director-General for Employment and Social Affairs) first examines all the relevant information, 
afterwards adopts the decision to authorise the expenditure and then asks the Accounting Officer to 
pay the sums involved. Such decisions obviously produce legal effects and it has been correctly 
contended that they can be reviewed judicially ((J. Scott, op. cit., p. 637).  
If Art. 230(1) EC Treaty is read in combination with Art. 249 EC Treaty, it is clear that the ECJ can 
review regulations, decisions and directives, inlcuding of course those concerning the ESF. However 
the criterion of review is not the form of an act but its substance. The ECJ has accepted that 
reviewable acts have binding force or produce legal effect, whatever their form(C-22/70, 
Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities, [1971] ECR 
263 paras 48-55). A simple letter (Joined Cases C-8/66, C-9/66, C-10/66, C-11/66, Cimenteries CBR 
Cementsbedrijven NV v. Commission of the European Communities, [1967] ECR 75), a 
communication (C-57/95, France v. Commission of the European Communities, [1997] ECR I-1627) 
and even a press release (C-106/96, United Kingdom v. Commission of the European Communities 
(re Poverty 4), [1998] ECR I-2729) from the Commission, has been held to be reviewable because of 
its contents.  
4
An interesting issue has arisen recently, regarding the internal guidelines adopted by the Commission 
concerning the net financial corrections in the context of the application of Art. 24 of Council 
Regulation 88/2052/EEC as amended by Council Regulation 93/2081/EEC. According to this 
provision the Commission may suspend or reduce the assistance granted to an operation if 
irregularities are found in that operation. The internal guidelines provide for the procedures within 
the Commission regarding the sums involved in such cases and in cases when the Member States 
violate their obligations under Art. 23(1) Council Regulation 88/2052/EEC as amended. These 
guidelines were challenged for lack of legal basis. The ECJ, however, ruled that they have effects 
only within the Commission, do not create rights or obligations of third parties, and consequently 
cannot be considered to produce legal effects, therefore they cannot be reviewed judicially.(2) The 
problem of the obligatory or advisory nature of internal guidelines regarding the Structural Funds 
and the management of the relevant resources has also been examined by the European Parliament. It 
was found that such ambiguity is useful as the threat of sanctions is necessary in order to oblige the 
Member States to treat the policy priorities of the Union more seriously (European Parliament, A4-
0214/98, p. 9). The legal services of the Parliament declared such guidelines legally binding but it 
has been noted that they would be more effective as advisory instruments or guiding principles 
whose force would lie in their relevance and applicability to the practitioners who seek to implement 
them (European Parliament, A4-0214/98, p. 9). Nevertheless, the Parliament regarded these 
guidelines as instruments designed to penalize irregularities attributable to the breach of the Member 
States’ obligations under Art. 23 of Regulation 88/4253/EEC (European Parliament, A4-0230/97, p. 
9). In light of this analysis, it seems that these guidelines produce more legal effects vis-à-vis the 
Member States than the ECJ acknowledged in its aforementioned ruling.  
It is has also been found that the reports and relevant recommendations adopted by the Union’s anti-
fraud bodies (previously UCLAF, now OLAF) after an inquiry on the management of Structural 
Funds’ resources, are not reviewable acts because they do not directly affect the legal position of the 
(natural or legal) persons concerned. These reports notify the national authorities of any irregularities 
or frauds detected and suggest follow-up action but it is the duty of the national authorities to 
actually take action, i.e. judicial proccedings, recovery action, etc (T-492/93, Nutral SpA v. 
Commission of the European Communities, [1993] ECR II-1023 at II-1033, II-1034, paras 26-29, C-
476/93 P, Nutral SpA v. Commission of the European Communities, [1995] ECR I-4125 at I-4146, I-
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In the area of the ESF the matter of reviewable acts has arisen several times. The normal practice 
under all Regulations so far regarding the ESF, was the following: the Commission issued a decision 
and sent a letter about this to the competent national authority, usually but not always enclosing the 
actual decision. The national authorities either wrote to the recipients of ESF assistance, informing 
them of the Commission’s decision, or more rarely, forwarded the letter of the Commission and the 
decision itself. Consequently most recipients of ESF assistance did not receive the actual 
Commission decision but a letter from a national authority informing them of it. The difficulty in 
challenging a decision under these circumstances is obvious. The ECJ, however, stated that if the 
informing letter did not provide sufficient information (e.g. the date and content of the decision), the 
applicants seeking the decision’s annulment could not be criticized for not providing in support of 
their application more extensive particulars concerning the contested decision (C-157/90, Infortec-
Projectos e Consultadoria Lda v. Commission of the European Community, [1992] ECR I-3525, at I-
3553 para 14). Of course, in order to challenge a decision, it is necessary for one to exist. If the 
applicants cannot furnish any evidence (not even a letter) of the existence of a decision, their action 
for annulment will be inadmissible (C-130/91, ISAE/VP (Instituto Social de Apoio ao Emprego e à 
Valorização Profissional) and Interdata (Centro de Processamento de Dados Lda) v. Commission of 
the European Communities, [1992] ECR I-69, at I-73 para 11). The existence in law of a decision 
regarding the ESF is to be determined having regard to its tenor and effects. Decisions concerning 
ESF assistance may be notified by an ordinary letter from the Directorate General for Employment 
and Social Affairs (T-446/93, Frinil v. Commission of European Communities, not published in the 
ECR, paras 29 and 32; Joined cases T-432/93, T-433/93 and T-434/93, Socurte-Sociedade de 
Curtumes a Sul do Tejo, Lda and Others v. Commission of the European Communities, [1995] ECR 
II-503 at II-519, II-520 para 47). The fact that the decision is formally embodied only in the 
documents by which it is notified (usually letters) does not call into question its existence in law 
(Joined cases T-432/93, T-433/93 and T-434/93, op. cit., p. II-520 para 47).  
It has also been noted that, for a measure to amount to a decision, those to whom it is addressed must 
be able to recognize clearly that they are dealing with such a measure (C-271/94, op. cit., p. II-764 
para 15). For example, the recovery orders issued by the Commission purport to be measures 
definitively reducing ESF assistance and requiring the recipient to reimburse part of the advance 
paid. Such orders affect the recipient’s legal position and thus constitute decisions that can be 
challenged under Art. 230 (C-199/91, Foyer Culturel du Sart-Tilman ASBL v. Commission of the 
European Communities, [1993] ECR I-2667 at I-2694 para 21; T-151/95, op. cit., p. II-1554 para 
39). The fact that such a decision may be communicated to the recipient of the assistance directly by 
the Commission instead of the competent national authority, does not affect its legal nature (C-
199/91, op. cit., p. I-2694 para 22). Similar recovery decisions can be issued by the competent 
national authorities regarding national contributions to the structural operations. Such decisions are 
not attributable to the Commission and it is for the competent national court, not the ECJ, to review 
the validity of such national measures implementing Community acts relating to ESF assistance (C-
271/94, op. cit., p. II-766 para 53).  
6
A final issue concerns the replacement of one Commission decision with another. This is not rare in 
the area of ESF assistance, since after the adoption of the first decision the national authorities or 
recipients of the assistance may submit remarks to the Commission that will make it change the 
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decision, the action against the original decision becomes devoid of purpose and the ECJ does not 
have to adjudicate on the relevant application (T-145/95, Proderec-Formação e Desenvolvimento de 
Recursos Humanos ACE v. Commission of the European Communities, [1997] ECR II-823 at 832 
para 27).  
2.2 Locus Standi   
Another problem concerning judicial review within the European Union involves the question of 
who may bring an action against a reviewable act. According to Art. 230 there are three categories of 
possible applicants.  
The first category includes the Member States, the Council and the Commission, which can 
challenge any reviewable act. For this reason they are called “privileged applicants” (See P. Craig-G. 
De Burca, 1998, p. 457, J. Steiner,-L. Woods, 1998, p. 457, W. Cairns, 1998, p. 110, A. Arnull, 
1995, p. 13). With regard to Member States, the ECJ has accepted that these may have “legitimate 
expectations” regarding the grant of assistance by the ESF, which expectations can be enforced 
judicially (C-84/85, United Kingdom v. Commission of the European Communities (re Aid for part-
time work), [1987] ECR 3765 at 3798 paras 25-27). Moreover, the ECJ has held that since a Member 
State contributes to the Community Budget, it can rely on the damage which would arise from 
expenditure being incurred contrary to the rules regarding the financial management of the Union 
and its institutions (Joined Cases C-239/96, C-240/96, United Kingdom v. Commission of the 
European Communities (re Measures to combat poverty and social exclusion), [1996] ECR I-4475 at 
I-4492 para 66). An interesting question is whether regional or local authorities, which are often 
involved in the implementation of Structural operations and the management of ESF assistance, are 
also entitled to challenge any reviewable act. Initially, the ECJ accepted, indirectly (C-222/83, 
Municipality of Differdange and Others v. Commission of the European Communities, [1984] ECR 
2889), that regional and local authorities could bring actions only under Art. 230(4) (see below). On 
another occasion it stated that since the admissibility of an application of a regional or local authority 
was not contested, there were no grounds for examining it on its own initiative (Joined Cases C-
62/87 and C-72/87, Exécutif régional Wallon and SA Glaverbel v. Commission of the European 
Communities, [1988] ECR 1573 at 1592 para 8). More recently, however, the ECJ stated clearly that 
simply because it did not consider it necessary to examine the admissibility of an action brought by a 
regional or local authority did not imply acknowledgement that such an action was brought by a legal 
entity equivalent to a Member State (C-95/97, Région Wallone v. Commission of the European 
Communities, [1997] ECR I-1787 at I-1791 para 5). It also stated that the term “Member State” in 
Art. 230(2) refers only to government authorities and cannot include regional or local authorities, 
irrespective of the powers they may have (C-95/97, op. cit., I-1791 para 6). Therefore it must be 
accepted that regional and local authorities may challenge acts only under Art. 230(4), without 
enjoying privileged applicant status (E. Besila Vika-D. Papagiannis, 1996, p. 95-96). It has been 
noted that while regional authorities have a vital role to play in the articulation of cohesion and 
integration policies, the ECJ does not secure a role for them in judicial proceedings (A. Evans, 1999, 
p. 301).(3) This, however, contradicts the tendency promoted especially by the current provisions on 
the Structural Funds, according to which regional and local authorities are strongly encouraged to get 
involved in the management of structural resources. However, depriving them of the right to bring 
actions for annulment before the ECJ freely, which national authorities enjoy, is a serious 
disincentive, since they may regard this as deprivation of a more effective judicial protection.  
7
The second category of applicants is indicated in Art. 230(3). The Parliament, the European Court of 
Auditors and the European Central Bank are entitled to challenge only those reviewable acts that 
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limitation. (P. Craig-G. De Burca, op. cit., p. 458-460, J. Steiner,-L. Woods, op. cit., p. 457-458, A. 
Arnull, op. cit., p. 13).  
The third category includes the so called “non privileged applicants” (P. Craig-G. De Burca, op. cit., 
p. 461-473, J. Steiner,-L. Woods, op. cit., p. 458-472, W. Cairns, op. cit., p. 110-112, A. Arnull, op. 
cit., p. 12-13). According to Art. 230(4), this consists of any natural or legal person. The applicants 
may challenge only a) a decision addressed to them, b) a decision addressed to another person but of 
individual and direct concern to them, c) a decision in the form of a regulation which is of individual 
and direct concern to them. From these three options, the first is straightforward: the addressee of a 
decision can challenge this decision. The third option (challenging a decision “disguised” in the form 
of a regulation) is quite interesting (for a detailed analysis of the relevant case law see J. Usher, 
1994, pp. 636-640, R. Greaves, 1986, pp. 119-133, P. Craig-G. De Burca, op. cit., p. 466-473, J. 
Steiner,-L. Woods, op. cit., p. 460-463, P.J.G. Kapteyn, P. Verloren van Themaat, 1998, p. 481-488, 
A. Arnull, op. cit., p. 16-40, N. A. E. Neuwahl, 1996, pp. 17-31) but does not fall within the scope of 
this article, because according to the legislative framework of the Structural operations, the 
legislative instruments regarding the management of ESF assistance by the national authorities are 
decisions in the technical sense of the term as described in Art. 249 EC Treaty. The most common 
case in the management of ESF assistance is a decision addressed to another person but of direct and 
individual concern to the applicant. Usually the decision is a Commission act, addressed to the 
national authorities but concerning the recipients of ESF assistance individually and directly.  
It is therefore necessary to examine more in detail the condition of “direct and individual concern”. 
This condition is the clearest indication that there cannot be an “actio popularis”, especially in 
proceedings regarding the management of ESF assistance. There are always economic actors which 
are quite eager to challenge Community acts when the annulment thereof may mean the continuation 
of their business profits and the repayment of any sums unduly paid under an illicit Community 
measure (N. A. E. Neuwahl, op. cit., p. 18). The financial stakes may be high and there are always 
attempts to “torpedo Community administration in pursuit of individual interests” (P.J.G. Kapteyn, 
P. Verloren van Themaat, op. cit., p. 477). This is sometimes the case with ESF assistance. The 
amounts involved are large and there are always those who are willing to profit at the expense of 
Community structural assistance. Consequently, in order to protect, inter alia, the Communities’ 
financial interests there is a test. Any natural or legal person seeking the annulment of an act relating 
to the management of ESF assistance must prove that it is directly and individually concerned by that 
act. This is a cumulative test: both conditions (direct concern, individual concern) must be met (N. A. 
E. Neuwahl, op. cit., p. 20).  
8
The ECJ’s method of establishing individual concern is found in its judgement in Plaumann, 
according to which (see C-25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission of the European Communities, 
[1963] ECR 95 at 107):  
“Persons…may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects them by 
reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in 
which they are differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue of these factors 
distinguishes them individually…”.  
The general rule for direct concern is that if a Member State is granted any discretion to act under the 
disputed provision, then the provision by its nature cannot give rise to direct concern (Joined Cases 
C-41/70, C-42/70, C-43/70, C-44/70, NV International Fruit Company v. Commission of the 
European Communities, [1971] ECR 411, at 422-423, paras 25-28). Furthermore, it has been found 
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institutions have been granted broad discretion to act the applicants cannot claim that the provisions 
granting this discretion, concern them directly (T-113/96, Édouard Dubois et Fils v. Council of the 
European Union and Commission of the European Communities, [1998] ECR II-125 at II-146, II-
147, paras 59-66). These general definitions have been applied by the ECJ and the CFI in several 
cases regarding the management of ESF assistance. As mentioned above, normally the Commission 
sends a letter to the competent national authorities, usually incorporating its decision about approval, 
reduction, suspension or withdrawal of the ESF assistance (the majority of cases before the ECJ and 
the CFI concerned reduction of this assistance). It has been held repeatedly that the contested 
decision, although addressed only to the national authorities, since it named and expressly referred to 
the applicants as direct beneficiaries of the assistance granted, was of direct and individual concern 
to the applicants inasmuch as it deprived them of part of the assistance originally granted to them, the 
Member States having no discretion in that respect (C-291/89, Interhotel v. Commission of the 
European Communities, [1991] ECR I-2257 at I-2279 para 13; C-304/89, Estabelecimentos Isidoro 
M. Oliveira SA v. Commission of the European Communities, [1991] ECR I-2283 at I-2311 para 13, 
C-157/90, op. cit., p. I-3554 para 17; C-181/90, Consorgan-Gestão de Empresas, Lda v. Commission 
of the European Communities, [1992] ECR I-3557 at I-3568 para 12; C-189/90, Cipeke-Commércio 
e Indústria de Papel Lda v. Commision of the European Communities, [1992] ECR I-3573 at I-3585 
para 12; T-450/93, Lisrestal-Organização Gestão de Restaurantes Colectivos Lda and Others v. 
Commission of the European Communities, [1994] ECR II-1177 at II-1195 paras 45-46; T-85/94, 
Eugénio Branco Lda v. Commission of the European Communities, [1995] ECR II-45 at II-55 paras 
25-26). Clearly, it follows that this rule also applies to decisions granting ESF assistance, since the 
concerned parties are mentioned therein as beneficiaries. Thus, the ECJ and the CFI have adjusted 
their case law to the practice followed by the Commission in deciding on the management of ESF 
assistance. It has been suggested that whenever the Commission refuses payment of assistance which 
it has previously undertaken to grant, it disputes a prior commitment or denies the existence of a 
prior commitment, thereby adopting an act having legal effect and which can be challenged (A. 
Evans, op. cit., p. 295). This may happen when persons who had previously applied for assistance 
have participated in protracted procedures for evaluation of their application by the Commission (see 
T-465/93, Consorzio Gruppo di Azione Locale “Murgia Messapica” v. Commission of the European 
Communities, [1994] ECR II-361 at II-373 para 26).  
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A relevant issue concerns the competitors of the recipient(s) of assistance. These may challenge the 
legality of a decision to grant the assistance where their market position has been “significantly 
effected” by the assistance (C-169/84, Cie Française de l’ Azote (COFAZ) SA v. Commission of the 
European Communities, [1986] ECR 391 at 415 para 28; Joined Cases T-447/93, T-448/93, T-
449/93 Associazione Italiana Tecnico Economica del Cemento, British Cement Association, Titan 
Cement Company SA v. Commission of the European Communities, [1995] ECR II-1971 at II-1994 
paras 55-56 and II-2002 para 80). However it has been noted that simply because a decision affects 
competition in the market, a trader in any competitive relationship with the recipient cannot be 
regarded as directly and individually concerned by that decision (A. Evans, op. cit., p. 296). Only 
specific circumstances can give standing (Joined Cases C-10/68, C-18/68, Società “Eridania” 
Zuccherifici Nazionali v. Commission of the European Communities, [1969] ECR 459 at 481), such 
as the competitor being located in the same region as the recipient (A. Evans, op. cit., p. 296), or the 
competitor participating in the proceedings leading to the contested decision (A. Arnull, op. cit., p. 
33, C-169/84, op. cit., p. 415, paras 25-26, C-264/82, Timex Corporation v. Council and Commission 
of the European Communities, [1985] ECR 849 at 865, paras 12-16). It has been suggested that the 
ECJ should acknowledge the admissibility of actions brought by natural or legal persons whose 
participation in the proceedings can be regarded as having affected their outcome.(4) There are 
positive reactions to this suggestion which is considered conducive to a healthy democracy, by 
promoting both public participation in the decision-making process and the control of the legality of 
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extent of the involvement necessary to confer standing, or the criteria for establishing that the 
outcome of a procedure has been influenced (N. A. E. Neuwahl, op. cit., p. 27). It must be noted that, 
with regard to ESF management, the participation of all interested parties in the relevant decision-
making procedure is sometimes obligatory, thus constituting an essential procedural requirement (see 
below).  
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Finally, reference must be made to the locus standi of certain groups such as trade associations or 
interest groups (A. Evans, op. cit., p. 296-300). Trade associations must prove that they have a 
“personal” interest in the case by showing that this interest is distinct from those of the industrial 
policy of the Member State concerned (C-282/85, Comité de Développement et de Promotion du 
Textile et de l’ Habillement v. Commission of the European Communities, [1986] ECR 2469 at 2481 
para 18 ) . A trade association does not have locus standi if the decision affects the general interests 
of the category of persons represented by this association (Joined Cases 16/62, 17/62, Confédération 
Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Legumes v. Council of the European Economic Community, 
[1962] ECR 471 at 479-480; T-117/94, Associazione Agricoltori della Provincia di Rovino v. 
Commission of the European Communities, [1995] ECR II-455 at II-466 para 27-28). A relevant 
criterion established by case law is that an association may challenge a decision only where its 
members can also do so individually (T-197/95, Sveriges Betodlares Centralförening and Sven Åke 
Henrikson v. Commission of the European Communities, [1996] ECR II-1283, at II-1296-1297, para 
35). It has also been found that representative bodies have standing to challenge decisions not 
addressed to them, in the field of state aids (C-313/90, Comité Internationale de la Rayonne et des 
Fibres Synthetiques (CIRFS) and others v. Commission of the European Communities, [1993] ECR 
I-1125 at 1185, paras 29-30, Joined Cases 67,68 and 70/85, Kwekerij Gebroeders Van der Kooy BV 
and Others v. Commission of the European Communities, [1988] ECR 219 at 268-269, paras 20-24). 
These bodies must have been in close contact and cooperation with the Commission during the 
proceeding leading to the adoption of the decisions in question, which must affect their members’ 
interests. With regard to interest groups, that same reasoning has proven to be problematic (A. 
Evans, op. cit., p. 297). An example is provided in the area of environmental protection, which is 
now a high priority among the objectives of structural action. According to the current provisions on 
the Structural Funds all programmes financed must take account of the environment. The CFI, 
however, has found that Greenpeace, a major environmental group, has no standing to challenge a 
decision granting assistance the use of which might affect the environment because its members’ 
interests were not individually affected (T-585/93, Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace 
International) v. Commission of the European Communities, [1995] ECR II-2205 at II-2230, II2231 
para 60). It has been observed, however, that environmental protection is now such an integral part 
of cohesion, and the link between structural assistance and environmental protection is so strong, that 
it should justify judicial action not only by those individually affected but also by groups 
representing such persons (A. Evans, op. cit., p. 298). Nevertheless, the ECJ recently reaffirmed the 
CFI’s opinion, ruling once more that associations such as Greenpeace have no locus standi since 
their members are not individually concerned but are concerned only in a general and abstract 
fashion, like any other person interested in the protection of the environment (C-321/95, Stichtng 
Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and others v. Commission of the European 
Communities, [1998] ECR I-1651 at I-1715, paras 28-29).  
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2.3 Grounds for Annulment   
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competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of 
any rule of law relating to its application and misuse of powers.(5) It has been ruled that the grounds 
for annulment must be clearly stated in the relevant application, indicating the basic legal and factual 
particulars of the case and avoiding “catch-all” references to other documents annexed to the 
application, since it is not for the Court to seek and identify from the annexes the grounds on which 
the application is based (T-84/96, op. cit., p. II-2090, II-2091 paras 29-34).  
2.3.1 Lack of Competence   
This ground for annulment is the natural corollary of Art. 7 EC Treaty according to which all 
Community institutions must act within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by Community 
law (W. Cairns, op. cit., p. 114). A Community institution must have legal authority to adopt a 
measure, otherwise this measure shall be declared void for lack of competence. With regard to the 
management of ESF assistance the issue arising is the competence of the Commission’s departments 
to issue decisions about ESF assistance. In Funoc the applicant submitted that the decision in 
question was not taken by the Commission itself but by the Head of Division of the Directorate 
General for Employment and Social Affairs, who was not empowered to do so. The ECJ noted that 
under the applicable provisions regarding the Commission’s structure, the Directorate General for 
Employment and Social Affairs is responsible for managing ESF, in cooperation with the Financial 
Controller (C-200/89, Funoc v. Commission of the European Communities, [1990] ECR 3669 at 
3691-3692 paras 12-13). There is a Directorate of ESF affairs within the Directorate General for 
Employment and Social Affairs. This department is competent to manage ESF affairs, including 
granting, withdrawing, reducing or suspending ESF assistance, through the system of delegation of 
signature, which is the normal means used by the Commission in exercising its powers. Delegation 
of authority to sign within an institution is a measure relating to the internal organization of the 
Commission’s administrative departments in accordance with its Rules of Procedure. Therefore, 
officials may be empowered to adopt in the Commission’s name and subject to its control, clearly 
defined measures of management and administration relating to the ESF (Case T-450/93, op. cit., p. 
II-1191, 1192 para 34). The applicant must prove the Commission’s Rules of Procedure have been 
violated and not refer generally to the Regulations on the Structural Funds which mention only the 
Commission in general as the competent body for the relevant decisions.  
2.3.2 Infringement of an essential procedural requirement    
Community law provides various mechanisms to ensure that certain requirements of natural justice 
and fairness are observed in procedural matters (W. Cairns, op. cit., p. 115). The infringement of 
such a requirement will result in the annulment of the measure. The ECJ may consider this ground of 
annulment on its own motion, even if it is not put forward by the applicants (C-1/54, France v. High 
Authority, [1954] ECR 1 at 15, C-2/54, Italy v. High Authority, [1954] ECR 37 at 52). In the CFI’s 
opinion this happens because individuals have a legitimate interest in relying in the Community 
courts (ECJ, CFI) regarding a possible non-observance of the procedure laid down by the 
Regulations regarding the Structural Funds, inasmuch as such an irregularity could affect the legality 
of the contested decisions concerning them (Joined Cases T-432/93, T-433/93, T-434/93, op. cit., p. 
II-525 para 63).  
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One essential procedural requirement often infringed has been the obligation of the Commission to 
consult the Member State concerned before issuing a decision regarding the ESF assistance given to 
that State. This obligation is established by all Regulations concerning the operations of the 
Structural Funds. The Member State is the sole interlocutor of the ESF and it is responsible for the 
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central role of the Member State and to the importance of the responsibilities which it assumes in the 
presentation and supervision of the financing of vocational training measures, the opportunity for it 
to comment and present its opinion before a definitive decision regarding ESF assistance is adopted 
constitutes an essential procedural requirement the disregarding of which renders the contested 
decision void (C-291/89, op.cit., p. I-2280 paras 16-17; C-304/89, op. cit., p. I-2312 paras 20-21; C-
199/91, op. cit., p. I-2696 para 34; C-334/91, Innovation et Reconversion Industrielle ASBL v. 
Commission of the European Communities, [1993] ECR I-2851 at I-2869 para 25; C-157/90, op. cit., 
p. I-3554, I-3555 para 20).  
A similar requirement also exists for individuals (natural and legal persons) by virtue of a relevant 
general principle, according to which any person who may be adversely affected by the adoption of a 
decision should be able to effectively make known his views on such evidence concerning him as the 
Commission has used in adopting that decision (T-450/93, op. cit., p. II-1194 para 42; C-32/95, 
Commission of the European Communities v. Lisrestal-Organização Gestão de Restaurantes 
Colectivos Lda and Others, [1996] ECR I-5373 at I-5396 para 21). In the case of ESF assistance, it 
has been noted that despite the central role played by the Member States in the system established by 
the Regulations concerning the Structural Funds, there is a direct link between the Commission and 
the recipient of the assistance since the latter is directly implicated in the investigation leading to the 
decision (C-32/95, op. cit., p. I-5396, I-5397 paras 24 and 28). A classic example of such a case 
might be a decision reducing, suspending or withdrawing ESF assistance, which significantly affects 
the recipients’ interests by depriving them of the whole of the assistance initially granted to them, 
and is equivalent to a sanction (C-32/95, op. cit., p. I-5398, paras 33-34). It is necessary therefore for 
the recipients of ESF assistance to submit their opinion to the Commission before it adopts its 
decision.  
It has been found that the possibility for a Member State and the final recipient of ESF assistance to 
enter into a dialogue with the Commission after the relevant decisions have been notified to them is 
not an acceptable solution. It would practically bar them from bringing an action under Art. 230 
because of a possible expiry of the relevant time- limits (C-304/89, op. cit., p. I-2313 para 23). Also 
the mere presence of representatives of the national authorities, during on-the-spot checks performed 
by the Commission in the premises of the final recipient in order to form an opinion and produce the 
decision, does not guarantee that these authorities or the recipient itself are consulted before the 
adoption of the decision.(6) Furthermore, when discussions are actually taking place between the 
representatives of the Commission, the national authorities and the final recipients, they must refer to 
the specific project and decision and not to a comparable one (Joined Cases T-432/93, T-433/93, T-
434/93, op. cit., p. II-530 para 74). Finally, any political compromises reached between the national 
authorities and the Commission cannot, in any event, substitute the requirement of previous 
consultation (Joined Cases T-432/93, T-433/93, T-434/93, op. cit., p. II-530 para 75).  
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Another essential procedural requirement is provided for by Articles 253 and 254 EC Treaty 
according to which all regulations, directives and decisions adopted by the European institutions 
must state the reasons on which they are based.(7) The purpose of this obligation is to enable the 
Court to review the legality of the decision and to provide the person concerned with sufficient 
information to make it possible to ascertain whether the decision is well founded or whether it is 
vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested. The extent of that obligation 
depends on the nature of the measure in question and on the context in which it was adopted (C-
32/86, Società industrie siderurgiche meccaniche e affini SpA (Sisma) v. Commission of European 
Communities, [1987] ECR 1654 at 1670, para 8). It has been found that in the context of an initial 
application for ESF assistance, a statement of reasons in summary form satisfies the requirements of 
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of several thousand applications for assistance on which the Commission must adjudicate within a 
short period of time as a more detailed statement of reasons in support of each individual application 
would compromise the rational and efficient allocation of financial assistance from the ESF (C-
213/87, Gemeente Amsterdam and Stichting Vrouwenvakschool voor Informatica Amsterdam (VIA) 
v. Commission of the European Communities, [1990] ECR I-221 at I-222). This is justified by the 
fact that a decision accepting or rejecting an application merely entails the grant or refusal of the 
assistance applied for (C-181/90, op. cit, p. I-3569 para 15; C-181/90, op. cit., p. I-3586 para 15).  
However, with regard to decisions reducing, withdrawing or suspending ESF assistance, it has been 
accepted that these decisions entail more serious consequences for the recipients (C-181/90, op. cit, 
p. I-3569 para 16; C-181/90, op. cit., p. I-3586 para 16): According to the Regulations on ESF the 
recipients initially receive only an advance from the assistance approved, so they are obliged to 
advance considerable sums from their own capital in order to cover the total expenditure of the 
operation. The recipients legitimately expect to receive the balance from the ESF, provided that they 
use the assistance in accordance with the conditions set out in the decision of approval. 
Consequently, a decision reducing, suspending or withdrawing ESF assistance must clearly state the 
reasons which justify such action (C-181/90, op. cit, p. I-3569 paras 17-18; C-181/90, op. cit., p. I-
3586 paras 17-18; T-450/93, op. cit., p. II-1197 para 52; T-85/94, op. cit., p. II-57 para 33). It must 
be noted that the issue of whether these reasons are correct or not, does not concern the adequacy of 
the statement of reasons but the substance of the case (T-84/96, op. cit., p. II-2094, para 49).  
Examples of decisions which fulfil the above analyzed requirement are: a decision reducing ESF 
assistance because the period of practical vocational training had to be the same as that of theoretical 
vocational training (C-181/90, op. cit., p. I-3569, I-3570, paras 19-20); a decision reducing ESF 
assistance after a relevant suggestion of the Member State only if that decision itself states the 
reasons for the reduction, or if it refers to a measure of the competent national authorities clearly 
stating the reasons (T-85/94, op. cit., p. II-58 para 36); a decision accompanied by a memorandum 
detailing reductions in respect of specific headings of expenditure because this expenditure was not 
provided for in the initial application, or because this expenditure was not duly evidenced by the 
necessary supporting documents (T-81/95, Interhotel v. Commission of the European Communities, 
[1997] ECR II-1265 at II-1293 paras 74-76); and a decision devoting several pages to a detailed 
account of the factual and legal considerations forming the basis of the justification in law of the 
reduction, especially of the itemization of reduction in each heading and of the method of calculation 
applied in these reductions (T-84/96, op. cit., p. II-2094, paras 48-49).  
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Decisions which have been found not to fulfil the requirement of the statement of reasons are: a 
decision reducing ESF assistance, allocating the reduction between the members of the group of 
beneficiaries in proportion to their share under the items concerned and not in accordance with the 
precise amount of the irregular expenditure, and not notifying the beneficiaries about this itemization 
and the method of calculation (C-181/90, op. cit., p. I-3570 paras 22-23; C-181/90, op. cit., p. I-3587 
paras 20-21); and a decision based on inspection reports which did not identify with respect to each 
of the beneficiaries the items to which the reduction related (T-450/93, op. cit., p. II-1197, para 52).  
2.3.3 Infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application   
The term “any rule of law relating to the Treaty’s application” does not only include legislative 
measures adopted by the Community institutions but also the so called general principles of 
Community law. These can be defined as unwritten legal rules adopted by the ECJ and deriving from 
the common legal traditions of the Member States. Their use in the legal system of the European 
Seite 12 von 22 EIoP: Text 2002-001 Full Text
29.01.02 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-001.htmUnion is to supplement and clarify written European legislation. Some of the most important general 
principles of Community law are the principle of proportionality, the principle of legal certainty, and 
the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.  
Some general principles have been invoked in cases regarding the management of ESF assistance. 
For instance, the ECJ has ruled that it is not disproportionate for the Commission to substantially 
reduce the ESF assistance granted to a project of vocational training after considering the recipients’ 
private interests, if during the implementation of the project there are substantive modifications to 
the original contents on which the approving decision of the Commission was based (C-200/89, op. 
cit., p. I-3694 paras 25-26). It has also been found that the protection of legitimate expectations is not 
violated when the Commission reduces ESF assistance initially granted to a programme, when it 
discovers irregularities in the programmes’ implementation, which prove that the programme was 
not implemented according to the approving decisions (T-73/95, Estabelecimentos Isidoro M. 
Oliveira SA v. Commission of the European Communities, [1997] ECR II-381 at II-395, II-396 paras 
34-35). The CFI also stated that since in the case of annulment of a Commission act it is justifiable 
for the Commission to re-examine the entire case file in order to produce a new act, this being a very 
time consuming procedure, there is no violation of the principle of legal certainty because a delay in 
the process of complying with a judgment is not liable in itself to affect the validity of the measure 
finally adopted (T-73/95, op. cit., p. II-398, II-399 paras 43-47).  
However, it has been ruled that when the Commission reduces the ESF assistance granted to a 
programme based on provisions of the initial approving decision which were not notified to the 
recipients of the assistance, it violates the principle of legitimate expectations (T-81/95, op. cit., p. II-
1286-II-1288, paras 49-57).  
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In general it has been noted that the rationale behind the use of the principles of legal certainty and 
legitimate expectations is that foreseeability as to the payment of assistance is necessary to enable 
the recipients to commit themselves to expenditure, being free of the risk of ultimately having to bear 
the burden of it themselves (A. Evans, op. cit., p. 302).  
In the case of withdrawal of unlawfully granted assistance there could be a conflict between the 
principle of legality of financial management of Community resources and the principle of legal 
certainty of the recipients. In other words, a conflict between the public interest in the management 
of Community funds and the private interest of the recipients thereof (A. Evans, op. cit., p. 303). 
Usually in such a conflict the public interest prevails over the private interest (Joined Cases T-
551/93, T-231/94, T-232/94, T-233/94, T-234/94, Industrias Pesqueras Campos SA, Transacciones 
Maritimas SA, Recursos Marinos SA, Makuspesa SA v. Commission of the European Communities, 
[1996] ECR II-247 at II-278 para 76).  
A final point involves the initial decision granting or refusing assistance. The Commission is usually 
considered to have considerable discretion since it must evaluate economic circumstances, assess 
complex facts and accounts or determine which of the several Union objectives are better served by 
the application in question. However this discretion is not unlimited and the Commission assessment 
and decision may be overturned if there is an “erreur manifeste d’ appréciation”, a clear error of 
assessment (A. Evans, op. cit., p. 303-304). Such an error exists when, for instance, although the 
project’s description fits the policies adopted to meet the Union’ priorities the Commission rejects 
the relevant application (C-213/87, op. cit., p. I-221).  
2.3.4 Misuse of Powers   
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competences to achieve an end other than the one for which the competence was granted, or to have 
evaded a procedure specifically prescribed by the Treaties for enacting the measure in question (C-
84/94, United Kingdom v. Council of the European Communities (“Working time Directive”), [1996] 
ECR I-5755 at 5814, para 69), the resulting act is void. So far, with regard to ESF assistance, there 
no cases have been brought on this ground. This is understandable, given the difficulty in 
establishing such a case. A possible misuse of power in the area of ESF assistance could be a 
decision of the Commission to reduce, withdraw or suspend the assistance granted, or to reject an 
initial application for ESF assistance, simply because the Commission wishes to put pressure on the 
Member State concerned to fulfil another EC Law obligation.  
2.4 Time Limits   
According to Art. 230(5) EC Treaty all proceedings for the annulment of a measure must be 
instituted within two months of its publication, or of its notification to the applicant (or, in the 
absence thereof, of the day on which it first came to the applicant’s attention). Furthermore, it has 
been ruled that failing publication or notification, it is for a party having knowledge of a decision 
concerning it to request the whole text thereof within a reasonable period, but that the period for 
bringing an action can begin to run only from the moment when the third party concerned acquired 
precise knowledge of the content of the decision in question and of the reasons of it adoption, in such 
a way as to enable it to exercise its right of action (C-236/86, Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG v. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1988 [ECR] 3761 at 3784 para 14; T-465/93, Consorzio 
Gruppo di Azione locale “Murgia Messapica” v. Commission of the European Communities, [1994] 
ECR II-361 at 374 para 69).  
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In the case of ESF assistance, given that the usual method of communication between the 
Commission, the competent national authorities and the recipients of the assistance is mail 
correspondence, there have been cases where the starting date of the period during which a decision 
could be challenged was not easily established. Usually the Commission informs the national 
authorities of its decision and the reasons justifying it, and then the national authorities inform the 
beneficiaries. The information provided to the beneficiaries contains an abstract of the decisions and 
a general statement of the justifying reasons. The beneficiaries must request, as stated the whole text 
of the decision and the reasons within a reasonable period of time. This period of time starts when 
the beneficiaries first discover that the decision exists. It has been found that any direct or indirect 
reference to such a decision in a letter from the Commission to the beneficiaries constitutes a method 
of bringing the decision’s existence to the beneficiaries’ attention (T-151/95, op. cit., p. II-1556, II-
1557 paras 46-48). It has also been found that 2 years is an unreasonably long period for the 
beneficiaries to wait before requesting the whole text of the decision (T-468/93, Frinil-Frio Naval e 
Industrial SA v. Commission of the European Communities, [1994] ECR II-33 at II-45 paras 32-34). 
The beneficiaries, however, may challenge the decision based only on the notification of its 
existence. Since the notification does not state neither the date nor the content of the decision, the 
beneficiaries cannot be criticized for not providing in support of their application more extensive 
particulars about the decision (C-157/90 op. cit., p. I-3553 para 14). Once the beneficiaries have 
requested the whole text of and reasons for a decision, the national authorities and Commission 
cannot merely send a brief summary. Only when the beneficiaries receive the full text and reasons, 
does the period in which the decision may be challenged commence (Joined Cases T-432/93, T-
433/93, T-434/93, op. cit., p. II-521 paras 50-51; C-143/95P, Commission of the European 
Communities v. Socurte-Sociedade de Curtumes a Sul do Tejo, Lda and Others, [1997] ECR I-1 at I-
21, I-22 para 31-32). A final issue concerns the aforementioned possibility of a dialogue between the 
Commission, the national authorities and the beneficiaries after the adoption of the decision. This 
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and issues another one, after the dialogue, merely confirming the first decision, the beneficiaries 
would not be able to challenge the second decision since they did not challenge the first within the 
appropriate time limits (C-304/89, op. cit., p. I-2313 para 24).  
3 Actions for failure to act   
With special regard to the management of ESF resources, there are three main problems. First, there 
is the problem of reviewing omissions to adopt non-reviewable acts. The second problem concerns 
the locus standi of non-privileged applicants. The third issue concerns the procedural problems 
involved in bringing an action for failure to act. The relevant provisions are included in Art. 232(1) 
EC Treaty:  
“Should the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission, in infringement of 
this Treaty, fail to act, the Member States and the other institutions of the Community 
may bring an action before the Court of Justice to have the infringement established.”  
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The main issues are the same as those analyzed above regarding actions against acts: What are 
reviewable omissions? Who may bring an action against an omission and on what grounds? What are 
the relevant time limits? Therefore reference will be made in this section only to the issues which 
require a different approach.  
With regard to reviewable omissions, it has been noted that because of the unity principle, failures to 
act within the scope of Art. 232(1) are failures to adopt only a reviewable act (P. Craig-G. De Burca, 
op. cit., p. 491, J. Steiner,-L. Woods, op. cit., p. 482, P.J.G. Kapteyn, P. Verloren van Themaat, op. 
cit., p. 468). However the ECJ has allowed the Parliament to challenge the failure to adopt an act 
which was not reviewable.(8) Within the field of ESF, reviewable acts have been defined above. 
Given the complexity of the system of managing ESF funds, it would be very dangerous to allow 
anyone to challenge omissions to adopt non-reviewable acts. This could lead to confusion, since both 
the Commission and the national authorities are responsible for several acts regarding the Funds 
management. It is true that the omissions of national authorities can be challenged only before 
national courts. However the natural and legal persons involved in these cases, especially if not 
accustomed to such complex mechanisms, might not be able to determine who has competence to 
issue an act and whether he/she has failed to do so. This problem is highlighted in the case of 
projects implemented under operational programmes.  
As in Art. 230 natural and legal persons are non privileged applicants since they can only challenge 
failures to act in connection with measures addressed to them. They cannot challenge failures to 
adopt recommendations or opinions. The ECJ has ruled that it is possible for a non privileged 
applicant to challenge a failure regarding an act not addressed to him as long as this applicant is 
directly and individually concerned (C-107/91, Empresa Nacional de Urânio SA (ENU) v. 
Commission of the European Communities, [1993] ECR I-599 at I-630 para 17). The test of direct 
and individual concern is the same as that for Art. 230 EC Treaty.  
A final, important, issue involves the procedural requirements concerning the judicial review of 
omissions. According to Art. 232(2) EC Treaty an omission only exists where an institution that has 
been called upon to act fails to do so within two months. In that case the omission can be challenged 
within two months of the expiry of the first two-month period. This procedural requirement has been 
used by the ECJ and the CFI as a barrier, in order to prevent applicants challenging non existing 
Community decisions regarding the management of ESF assistance. More specifically it has been 
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when they challenge the act of a national authority before the ECJ (both actions would be 
inadmissible according to the analysis in the previous section), they cannot assume that their action is 
also an action for failure to act, because the “previous application” requirement and the time limits 
set in Art. 232 have not been complied with (C-130/91, op. cit, p. I-73 paras 11-12; T-271/94, op. 
cit., p. II-766 paras 53-55). The ECJ has also found that it is impossible to annul an act adopted after 
the two-month period within which it should have been adopted originally, precisely because of that 
delay in adoption. If such an annulment were allowed then it would be impossible, at that stage (after 
the period of two months) to adopt any valid decision about the issue concerned (T-81/95, op. cit., p. 
II-1261 para 67). The complexity of the procedures for managing ESF assistance at European and 
national level justifies delay in the adoption of acts about this issue and two months is not normally 
sufficient, especially when the act to be adopted involves detailed examination and analysis of the 
projects and the relevant financial provisions.  
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4 Enforcement Actions   
These actions, although indirectly connected with judicial review, may be activated within the 
framework of the management of ESF resources. Art. 226 EC Treaty provides for a procedure 
designed to ensure that all Member States fulfil their obligations under the Treaty:  
“If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation 
under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State 
concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.  
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by 
the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice.”  
This provision is regarded as central to the Commission’s role as “guardian of the Treaties”. It 
actually supplements Art. 211 EC Treaty according to which the Commission must ensure, inter alia, 
that the provisions of the Treaty and the measures taken by the institution pursuant thereto are 
applied (J. Hanlon, 1998, p. 99).  
With regard to the management of ESF assistance, this provision has become increasingly important, 
given the decentralization of this management to national authorities of the Member States. The 
Commission monitors the management of this assistance by national authorities and aims to verify its 
legality, regularity and financial soundness. It may issue reasoned opinions concerning this 
management.(9) These opinions must contain a coherent statement of the reasons which led the 
Commission to believe that the State in question failed to fulfil its obligations under Community law 
(C-7/61, Commission of the European Communities v. Italy, [1961] ECR 317 at 327). The national 
authorities must comply with them. If they do not, the Commission may bring an action before the 
ECJ. According to Art. 228, if this action is successful, the Member State must comply with the 
ECJ’s judgement. If it does not the Commission may once more issue a reasoned opinion and if the 
State continues not to comply, the case may again be brought before the ECJ, which may impose a 
penalty payment on the State.  
An interesting question arises when the Commission decides not to take action against a Member 
State under Art. 226 EC Treaty with regard to the management of structural assistance: does this also 
constitute a “silent decision” not to reduce or suspend Community financial assistance according to 
the relevant provisions of the Regulations on the Structural Funds (J. Scott, op. cit., p. 636)? The 
Court of First Instance found that these two procedures are independent and that not taking action 
under Art. 226 cannot automatically entail a decision not to reduce or suspend structural assistance. 
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has not taken action under Art. 226 does not prevent it from doing so at any time (T-461/93, An 
Taisce-The National Trust for Ireland and WWF UK (World Wide Fund for Nature) v. Commission 
of the European Communities, [1994] ECR II-733 at II-749, II-750, paras 35-36). This reasoning was 
also upheld by the ECJ which observed that reducing or suspending structural assistance does not 
depend on previous actions under Art. 226, although such actions might be taken into account (C-
325/94 P, An Taisce-The National Trust for Ireland and WWF UK (World Wide Fund for Nature) v. 
Commission of the European Communities, [1996] ECR I-3727, at I-3738, para 23).  
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Enforcement procedures may also be initiated by Member States against other Member States. This 
is provided for in Art. 227 EC Treaty, according to which the Member State must first bring the 
matter before the Commission, which shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the issue in question. After 
that opinion and if the Member States do not change their opinion the case may be brought before the 
ECJ. If the Commission does not deliver its reasoned opinion within three months the Member States 
may bring the case before the ECJ without it.  
With regard to the management of ESF assistance the provision of Art. 227 can be useful because 
most programmes financed by the ESF must have a transnational nature, involving authorities from 
numerous Member States. Therefore any problems arising between the cooperating Member States, 
during the implementation of such programmes, can be resolved using Art. 227.  
The Commission may initiate the Art. 226 procedure for a violation of any provision of Community 
law, primary or secondary. Given that the management of ESF assistance is regulated by Regulations 
and Decisions, this is important because the Treaty dispositions of the ESF now make direct 
reference to secondary Community legislation and do not include detailed provisions on this issue. 
This is also true for Art. 227 procedures.  
Furthermore, any violation of Community law by local authorities of the Member States is regarded 
as an act of the State concerned, so the defendant in a possible Art. 226 action before the ECJ would 
be the government of that State (C-95/97, op. cit., p. I-1792 para 7). No action can be brought against 
the local authorities themselves (E. Besila Vika-D. Papagiannis, op. cit., p. 97). This situation is quite 
satisfactory. Decentralization of management to the local authorities does not lead to decentralization 
of responsibility for this management, at least at Community level. This responsibility lies with the 
governments of the Member States. It is of course possible for these governments to bring actions 
before the national courts against the local authorities of these States for the violation of Community 
law.  
5 Preliminary Rulings   
The primary function of the preliminary rulings delivered by the ECJ according to Art. 234 is to 
contribute to the development of Community law by providing a mechanism for analyzing important 
concepts and issues such as the concept of direct effect or the issue of the relationship between the 
national and Community legal systems (For further details see P. Craig-G. De Burca, op. cit., p. 406-
452, J. Steiner,-L. Woods, op. cit., p. 414-440, W. Cairns, op. cit., p. 125-134, P.J.G. Kapteyn, P. 
Verloren van Themaat, op. cit., p. 499-525, J. Hanlon, op. cit., 124-137).  
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Community measures. The ECJ has jurisdiction to examine the validity of acts of Community 
institutions within the framework of the Preliminary Rulings procedure. This is regarded as an 
alternative to the direct actions procedure of Art. 230. The reasons for this include: a) the short 
period of two months within which a direct action can be brought, b) the fact that non priviledged 
applicants do not develop any interest in the review of Community action until this affects their 
activities, which might happen a long time after the adoption of the act in question and c) the 
possible lack of locus standi (C. Harding, 1981, p. 96). It has been argued, however, that there are 
several reasons why the Art. 234 procedure is less satisfactory than the Art. 230 procedure in order to 
review Community acts (Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in C-358/89, op. cit., p. I-2524, I-
2525, paras 71-74). First, the national courts have no experience in the subject. Secondly, the 
Council and Commission cannot participate in the proceedings under Art. 234. Thirdly, the ECJ’s 
analysis of the issue and its ruling is limited by the questions asked by the national courts, so the ECJ 
cannot study the problems in depth. Fourthly, there are extra delays and costs in proceedings before a 
national court, especially if an Art. 234 reference is involved. The final argument is that the national 
courts cannot review the legality of Community acts and declare them invalid (See C-314/85, Foto 
Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, [1987] ECR 4199 at 4230-4232 paras 14-20). However, the 
details of the relevant debate are beyond the scope of this article (for more details and an analysis of 
the relevant case law, see A. Arnull, op. cit., p. 41-44).  
Community acts concerning the management of ESF assistance are not always communicated 
immediately to the persons concerned. The result is that when they learn about these acts, they 
cannot challenge them before the Community courts. The solution to this problem, as indicated by 
the CFI itself, is Art. 234 (T-271/94, op. cit., p. II-766 para 53): The applicants will challenge (before 
the national courts) the acts of national authorities, based on the Community act(s) in question. The 
national courts may refer to the ECJ a question concerning the validity of these Community acts, 
under Art. 234. Thus the acts in question will be reviewed eventually. The drawback of this 
mechanism, however, is that national courts are not always obliged to make a preliminary reference 
to the ECJ. If they do not, the Community act in question may never be reviewed by the ECJ. In 
order to avoid such a situation the ECJ has shown that it can be receptive to actions brought either 
under Art. 230, by interpreting the provisions about time limits widely (see above), or under Art. 
234, by stating that it is possible for an applicant to challenge a measure under Art. 234, if this 
applicant did not know of this measure in time to challenge it directly under Art.230 (See C-188/92, 
TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v. Germany, [1994] ECR I-833 paras 23-24).  
6 Actions for damages   
It is potentially very useful for the final beneficiaries to be able to bring such actions against the 
Commission within the framework of the management of ESF resources. It provides an opportunity 
to claim money, which the Commission, unlawfully, may have not paid. The relevant disposition is 
Art. 288 EC Treaty according to which  
21
“The contractual liability of the Community shall be governed by the law applicable to 
the contract in question.  
In the case of non-contractual liability, the Community shall, in accordance with the 
general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage 
caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.”  
With regard to ESF assistance, there are no contracts between the Commission and the national 
authorities on the management of this assistance. Everything is regulated by Commission decisions. 
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national law. Community legislation on public procurement is also applicable.  
From the above remarks, it is concluded that the actions for damages, within the framework of the 
management of ESF assistance, focus on the Community’s non- contractual liability. The reviewable 
acts in such a case can be legislative or administrative. The legislative acts include the Regulations 
on the Structural Funds and the relevant implementing Decisions. So far no action has been brought 
against these legislative instruments. The reviewable administrative acts which may give rise to 
action for damages are the Commission decisions adopted within the framework of the 
implementation of the various programmes financed by the Structural Funds. Such decisions usually 
refer to the approval of financial assistance or to the withdrawal, reduction or suspension of the 
assistance initially granted. In order for such a decision to incur liability for the Community under 
Art. 288(2), the ECJ has established certain criteria: the conduct of the relevant Community 
institution (in this case the Commission) must be illegal, the applicant must have suffered some 
damage and this damage must be caused directly by the illegal conduct of the institutions (C-200/89, 
op. cit., p. I-3695 para 30). Usually the damage is an economic loss (loss actually incurred plus any 
loss of earnings – see Joined Cases C-5/66, C-6/66, C-7/66 and C-13/66 to 24/66, Firm E. 
Kampffmeyer and Others v. Commission of the European Communities, [1967] ECR 245 at 266) but 
it may include immaterial loss (W. Cairns, op. cit., p. 121). The illegality or fault of the relevant 
Community institution usually consists of the breach of a duty owed to the applicant under 
Community law (C-145/83, Stanley George Adams v. Commission of the European Communities, 
[1985] ECR 3539 at 3590 para 44). Finally, the causal link between the damage and the conduct of 
the institution in question has to be direct and well established (W. Cairns, op. cit., p. 122). These 
elements are very important in an action for damages against the Commission, within the framework 
of the management of ESF assistance. So far, however, such actions have been rare.  
A final point concerning these actions for damages, especially with regard to disputes about the 
management of ESF assistance, is that the applicants often confuse such actions with actions for 
annulment. When they bring an action for annulment, they include a request for the Court to order 
the Commission to pay amounts equivalent to the damage they have suffered, these amounts usually 
being the remaining sums of ESF assistance. The ECJ has ruled repeatedly that itself and the CFI, 
when reviewing the legality of an act under Art. 230, may only annul the contested act and cannot 
order the pay ment of damages (C-199/91, op. cit., p. I-2693 para 17; T-468/93, op. cit., p. II-46; 
Joined Cases T-432/93, T-433/93, T-434/93, op. cit., p. II-522 para 54). The Commission would 
have to pay the requested amounts according to Art. 233 EC Treaty which obliges the institutions to 
comply with the judgement of the Community courts. However, if the applicant’s claim were based 
on Art. 288, the ECJ and CFI would have jurisdiction to order the Commission to pay compensation 
for the damages caused by its illegal acts.  
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7 Final Remarks   
Having seen all these aspects of the judicial review proceedings, it is interesting to examine one final 
issue. Several potential applicants (mainly the European Parliament and the Member States) tend to 
use the judicial review mechanism in the European Union context not only in order to attack a 
particular legislative measure but also in order to obtain a public forum to express their viewpoint on 
the correct interpretation of particular provisions of Community law (H. Cullen, A. Charlesworth, 
1999, pp. 1245). This observation is very accurate with regard to interesting issues such as the 
implementation of the budget of the European Union, as well as issues relating to policies about 
education, labour, employment, and social policy (H. Cullen, A. Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 1251-
1253, 1254-1255, 1258-1260 and 1263-1264). In all these areas, the Parliament and the Member 
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such a politically delicate area like the one involving the measures financed by the ESF concerning 
employment, the expression of views and ideas is crucial. The contents of the policies implemented 
through the ESF are influenced by such ideas put forward by all actors involved, such as the 
European Institutions, the Member States, legal entities of private or public law and individuals. The 
judicial proceedings provide an additional forum for the presentation of views and opinions. After 
all, such proceedings affect the opinion of the institutions and the persons involved, concerning the 
institutional framework within which the structural and financing operations are carried out, which 
may generate pressure for institutional change and improvements with regard to the substance of the 
implemented policies (J. Scott, op. cit., p. 637).  
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Endnotes  
(*) The author wishes to thank Professor Rosa Greaves and Mrs Holly Cullen (Univesity of 
Durham), as well as Dr Joanne Scott (University of Cambridge) for their comments on earlier drafts 
of this article, and also the referees of EIoP for their remarks.  
(1) The partnership principle is defined as “Close consultations between the Commission, the 
Member State concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, 
local, or other level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal. The partnership 
shall cover the preparation, financing, monitoring and assessment of operations.” See Art. 8 of 
Council Regulation 99/1260/EC.  
(2) C-443/97, Spain v. Commission of the European Communities, judgement delivered on 6.4.2000, 
paras 28-36, available on line at http://curia.eu.int/en/jurisp/index.htm. The Advocate General in that 
case had a different opinion as he accepted that these internal guidelines allow the Commission to 
reduce or suspend structural assistance not only in case of irregularities (Art. 24 of Regulation 
88/2052/EEC as amended by Regulation 93/2081/EEC) but also in case of the Member States 
violating their obligations under Art. 23(1) of Regulation 88/2052/EEC as amended. Therefore they 
actually establish new sanctions for the Member States, thus producing legal effects and being 
reviewable by the ECJ (Advocate General’s opinion in C-443/97, delivered on 28.10.1999, paras 21-
24).  
(3) It has been suggested (see M. Vellano, Coesione economica e sociale e ripartizione de 
competenze: Le nuove iniziative communitarie, (1995) RDE, 193-208 at 194) that regional and local 
authorities should have standing to challenge a measure affecting their own prerogatives. Evans 
(op.cit., p. 301) considers however that the ECJ’s case law recognizes no link between such 
prerogatives and cohesion policies of the Union.  
(4) See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in C-358/89, Extramet Industrie SA v. Council of the 
European Communities, [1991] ECR I-2501 at I-2523, para 66. The ECJ however, in the same case, 
ignored this approach and focused on the nature of the applicants’ activity, see C-358/89, op. cit., p. 
I-2531, I-2532 paras 14-17. For an analysis of this behaviour see A. Arnull, op. cit., p. 34-35.  
(5) CFI has tried to make these grounds even more distinct from each other. For example, concerning 
the difference between the infringement of essential procedural requirement and infringement of 
Community legislation, it has held that: “…the absence or inadequacy of a statement of reasons 
constitutes a plea going to infringement of an essential procedural requirement and, as such, is 
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contrast, is reviewed in the context of the question whether a decision is well founded.” T-84/96, 
Cipeke-Comércio e Indústria de Papel Lda v. Commission of the European Communities, [1997] 
ECR II-2081 at II-2094 para 47.  
(6) See for instance C-334/91, op. cit., p. I-2869 paras 21-23; Joined Cases T-432/93, T-433/93, T-
434/93, op. cit., p. II-527, II 528 paras 68-71, where there was no substantive consultation between 
representatives of the Commission, national authorities and final recipients of ESF assistance even 
though they met and discussed the case within the framework of on-the-spot checks.  
(7) Usually these reasons are stated in the preamble of the act in question. However, the preamble is 
not judicially reviewable since it merely supports the operative part of the act and produces no legal 
effects itself. See T-138/89, Nederlandse Bankiersvereniging and Nederlandse Verenining van 
Banken v. Commission of the European Communities, [1992] ECR II-2181 at 2191, para 31.  
(8) C-302/87, European Parliament v. Council of the European Communities (“Comitology”), 
[1988] ECR 5615 at 5641 para 16. The act in question was the draft budget of the European 
Communities.  
(9) The Commission has a discretion to act under Art 169 [226] and it is not obliged to issue a 
reasoned opinion despite the wording of the Treaty. See C-247/87, Star Fruit Company SA v. 
Commission of the European Communities, [1989] ECR 291 at 301 para 11. Also the acts of the 
Commission under Art. 169 [226] have no legally binding effect. See C-48/65, Alfons Lütticke 
GmbH and Others v. Commission of the European Communities, [1966] ECR 19 at 27.  
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